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THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION
ACT OF 1996 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
VIRTUAL ANTITHESES
Sarah Sternberg*
INTRODUCTION
Soon it will not be necessary to actually molest children to produce
child pornography .... All that will be necessary will be an
inexpensive computer, readily available software, and a photograph
of a neighbor's child shot while the child walked to school or waited
for the bus.'
This prediction, made to the Senate in 1996, has become reality. It
is possible today to take a photo of an unsuspecting child waiting for a
bus and "morph" it into an explicit depiction of sexual activity.2 But if
the child pictured in the resulting pornography was not physically
abused in the image's creation, has the Peeping Tom neighbor done
any harm?
Believing the answer to be yes, Congress enacted the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA" or "the Act"),' and
broadened the definition of federally proscribed child pornography to
include such virtual creations.4  In the words of one court, [t]he
regulation... shifted from defining child pornography in terms of the
harm inflicted upon real children to a determination that child
pornography was evil in and of itself, whether it involved real children
or not."5 This shift raises serious First Amendment concerns.
* J.D. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Andrew Sims for his invaluable assistance with this Note. I would also like
to thank Mom, Dad, and Daniel for their love and faith, and for giving me a good kick
in the pants when I needed it.
1. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) (prepared testimony of Kevin V.
DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice),
available at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/congcomp.
2. See infra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing recent technological
advancements such as morphing and their effects on the child pornography industry).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999).
4. Id. § 2256(8); see also in ra Part I.C (discussing the legislative history of the
CPPA).
5. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted sub non. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
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The Supreme Court has determined that First Amendment
protection does not extend to child pornography,6 recognizing the
vital government interest in "prevent[ing] the abuse of children who
are made to engage in sexual conduct for commercial purposes."7 The
CPPA presents the issue of whether child pornography produced
without engaging actual children in sexual conduct falls within the
Supreme Court's definition of unprotected speech. Four appellate
courts have ruled on this question, with the First, Eleventh, and
Fourth Circuits upholding the constitutionality of the Act's expanded
definition of child pornography, and the Ninth Circuit finding it
violative of the First Amendment.8 The Supreme Court has recently
granted certiorari on the Ninth Circuit's decision.'
This Note examines the legal controversy currently before the
Supreme Court in Holder v. Free Speech Coalition,10 namely whether a
criminal statute that prohibits possession of and trafficking in sexually
explicit visual depictions of what appear to be minors impinges on the
First Amendment guarantees of free speech and expression. Part I
places this question in context by examining the problem of child
pornography, including the effects of new technologies on the
industry. Part I also analyzes the First Amendment issues
surrounding regulation of child pornography, and discusses Congress'
latest attempt at dealing with this problem, the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996. Part II analyzes the divergent treatment of
this issue in the appellate courts, including a discussion of the Ninth
Circuit opinion to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Part III argues
that the CPPA, as written, abridges defendants' First Amendment
rights, and it offers a suggestion for keeping the Act within the limits
mandated by the Constitution and the Supreme Court.
I. SETTING THE STAGE FOR CONFLICT: CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, THE
CPPA, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This part provides a backdrop for the conflict among the circuits.
Specifically, it discusses the harms associated with child pornography,
as well as the effects of computers and the Internet on the child
pornography industry, relevant First Amendment case law, and the
CPPA, Congress' latest response to the ever-evolving social ill of child
pornography.
6. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982); see also infra Part I.B
(discussing the relevant Supreme Court decisions in detail).
7. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
8. See infra Part II (discussing the split among the circuits on this issue).
9. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
10. Id.
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A. The "Pernicious Evil"" of Child Pornography
Child pornography "abuses, degrades and exploits the weakest and
most vulnerable members of our society, our children. It poisons the
minds and spirits of our youth, robbing them of their innocence ....
The harms associated with child pornography are as varied as they
are egregious. Most directly, child pornography sexually exploits the
children used in its production, which can cause both emotional and
psychological problems. 3 Child pornography also provides a record
of this sexual exploitation, 4 and the enduring nature of this record
makes child pornography "'an even greater threat to the child victim
than... sexual abuse or prostitution .... A child who has posed for a
camera must go through life knowing that the recording is circulating
within the mass distribution system for child pornography."' 5
Furthermore, "'[t]he victim's knowledge of publication of the visual
material increases the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the
child."'16 Pedophiles may use visual depictions of their child victims to
blackmail the youngsters into secrecy, 7 or to coerce the children into
recruiting more young victims for the abuser."s Child pornography
plays a crucial role in lowering a child's sexual inhibitions, 9 and
"[w]ith proper reinforcement, the victim can be conditioned into a
state of acceptance of his or her exploitive [sic] situation."'
11. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 12 (1996).
12. I&
13. By "sexual exploitation," this Note refers to the physical harm suffered by
victims of sexual abuse. One study describes the damaging effects sexual exploitation
has on children as follows:
First, the child is prematurely introduced into adult sexuality and may have
difficulty synchronizing the physical, emotional, and psychological
dimensions of this experience. As a result the child might perform
physiologically but not respond emotionally. In such a case the sexual
activity either becomes the only mode of emotional expression or becomes
separated and isolated from emotion. Second, the child may be
programmed to use sex to acquire recognition, attention, and validation as
well as to satisfy nonsexual needs. Third, the child may learn that sex is
something basically improper that needs to be cloaked in secrecy.
Ann W. Burgess et al., Impact of Child Pornography and Se Rings on Child Victims
and Their Families, in Child Pornography and Sex Rings 111, 111 (Ann Wolbert
Burgess ed., 1984). The authors' study drew on the experiences of "sixty-six children
and their families involved in sex rings."
14. See, eg., Daniel S. Campagna & Donald L. Poffenberger, The Sexual
Trafficking in Children 118 (1988) (noting that photographs or films may serve as a
tangible record of the abuse).
15. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982) (quoting Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 Wake Forest L Rev.
535, 545 (1981)).
16. Id (quoting Note, Protection of Children from Use in Pornography: Toward
Constitutional and Enforceable Legislation, 12 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 295, 301 (1979)).
17. Campagna & Poffenberger, supra note 14, at 118.
18. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 14 (1996).
19. Campagna & Poffenberger, supra note 14, at 118.
20. Id
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In addition to the abuse and exploitation of children who are used
as subjects of child pornography, child pornography works more
indirect or "secondary"'21 harms on children who are not used as
models. Child molesters may use child pornography as "instructional
aids," teaching children about the behavior that is expected of them
and demonstrating to them that engaging in such acts is normal. 2
"Peer pressure" in the form of visual depictions plays a crucial role in
"the 'cycle' of child pornography." 2  That cycle consists of seven
stages, namely (1) showing child pornography to a child for
"educational purposes," (2) attempting to persuade the child that
sexual activity is permitted and even pleasurable, (3) convincing the
child that because his peers engage in sexual activity such activity is
acceptable, (4) "desensitiz[ing] the child, [and] lowering the child's
inhibitions[,]" (5) engaging the child in sexual activity, (6)
photographing such sexual activity, and (7) using the resulting child
pornography to "attract and seduce yet more child victims."'24
Other harms associated with child pornography stem from the
effects such materials have on their viewers. Pedophiles and child sex
abusers use child pornography for "self-gratification," 25 or as Congress
recognized in enacting the CPPA, as a way "to stimulate and whet
their own sexual appetites. '26 Criminal investigations have shown that
almost all pedophiles collect child pornography.27 Some use their
collections solely to facilitate sexual fantasies that are never played
out.' Others, however, act upon the fantasies that their collections
arouse.29 One expert characterized child pornography as
an addiction that escalates, requiring more graphic or violent
material for arousal, [that] then leads to the persons in the materials
21. Samantha L. Friel, Note, Porn By Any Other Name? A Constitutional
Alternative to Regulating "Victimless" Computer-Generated Child Pornography, 32
Val. U. L. Rev. 207,246 (1997).
22. Campagna & Poffenberger, supra note 14, at 118; see also S. Rep. No. 104-358,
at 13 ("A child who may be reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to
pose for sexually explicit photos, can sometimes be persuaded to do so by viewing
depictions of other children participating in such activity.").
23. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 14 (quoting Shirley O'Brien, Child Pornography).
24. Id. (quoting Shirley O'Brien, Child Pornography).
25. Campagna & Poffenberger, supra note 14, at 118; see also S. Rep. No. 104-358,
at 12 ("Child pornography stimulates the sexual appetites and encourages the
activities of child molesters and pedophiles, who use it to feed their sexual
fantasies.").
26. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 8.
27. Id. at 12-13; see also Campagna & Poffenberger, supra note 14, at 118 (listing
"Collections" as one of the nine uses of child pornography, and noting that "[m]ost
hard-core pedophiles possess an extensive collection of adult and child
pornography").
28. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 13; see also Campagna & Poffenberger, supra note 14,
at 118 ("Child pornography either sparks or contributes to a heightened state of
arousal preparatory to masturbation.").
29. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 13.
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being seen as objects, without personality, rights, dignity or feelings.
The final stage is "acting out," doing what has been viewed in the
pornography. This leads to crimes of sexual exploitation and
violence.'
Another expert considers pedophilia "learned behavior],"
emphasizing the role child pornography plays in the learning process:
"[T]he use of child pornography in time desensitizes the viewer to its
pathology no matter how aberrant or disturbing. It becomes
acceptable and preferred. The man always escalates to more deviant
material, and the acting out continues and escalates .... "I'
This industry of exploitation has historically been a lucrative
undertaking, with recent profitability estimates ranging from the
multi-millions32 to the billions.33  "[B]ecause of the high ratio of
income to expense," individual pornographers fare quite well from
their trade.3' As one pornographer explained,
[t]he nicest thing about the [child pornography] business is that the
prices never go down; if anything, they will go up if the heat is on.
I've been at it about five, six years and can set my own prices most
of the time. Give me a pretty, cooperative 14-, 15-year-old girl and
I'll be sitting pretty with the money I make off her for a long time.
Longer than you can imagine. Unless the kid's a screw-up and tries
to run to the law, my chances of getting busted are pretty' low ....
And the nicest thing of all is I always got lots of customers. 5
Computers and the Internet have further increased the profitability of
child pornography for pornographers such as 39-year-old Charlie," by
decreasing costs, facilitating distribution, and increasing demand.-
30. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 1237 Before the
Senate Comn- on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1996) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 1237
(prepared testimony of Dee Jepsen, President, "Enough is Enough!"), available at
http://web.Iexis-nexis.com/congcomp.
31. Id (prepared testimony of Dr. Victor Cline).
32. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Sexual Exploitation of Children 1 130 (United Nations
Ctr. for Human Rights, Human Rights Study Series No. 8, 1996) (noting that one
"typical" organization "made millions of dollars kept in German banks by producing
and distributing child pornography" (quoting Reply of Defence for Children
International (United States) to the questionnaire circulated by the Special
Rapporteur on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornography in
1991)).
33. See S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 12 ("It has been estimated that pornography,
including child pornography, is an $8 to $10 billion a year business, and is said to be
organized crime's third biggest money maker, after drugs and gambling.")
34. Campagna & Poffenberger, supra note 14, at 133.
35. Id. at 116.
36. Id.
37. See Lydia W. Lee, Note, Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996:
Confronting the Challenges of Virtual Reality, 8 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 639, 644 (1999)
(citing the anonymity ensured by encryption technologies as a leading factor in the
recent proliferation of child pornography).
2787
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Recent technology has also made it possible to create child
pornography without the use of actual live children.38 Today, anyone
with a computer and inexpensive morphing software39 can join Charlie
and create "all too real"4 °-looking child pornography at low cost.41
The morphing software allows innocent photos of children to be
combined with pornographic images of adults to create realistic
pornographic images of children.4" These computer images, unlike
their print, film, or video counterparts, can be continuously duplicated
without jeopardizing their quality.43 The Internet has also made it
possible for people to feed their pedophiliac desires in virtual
anonymity, thus lowering the inhibitions of many would-be child
pornography viewers." Consequently, the Internet, "likely the most
thoroughly sweeping exchange medium of child pornography in
history,"45 has created "a new 'red light district' [wherein] an
38. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 7 ("[T]echnology has made possible the
production of visual depictions that appear to be of minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct which are virtually indistinguishable to unsuspecting viewers from
unretouched photographs of actual children engaging in identical sexual conduct.").
39. "'Morphing' is short for 'metamorphosing,' a technique that allows a computer
to fill in the blanks between dissimilar objects in order to produce a combined image."
Debra D. Burke, The Criminalization of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional
Question, 34 Harv. J. on Legis. 439, 440 n.5 (1997). Morphing software can be
purchased for less than $150. Id. at 440 n.7; Lee, supra note 37, at 645 n.23.
40. Hearing on S. 1237, supra note 30 (prepared testimony of Kevin V.
DiGregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Division, Dept. of Justice).
41. See S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 15 ("A child pornographer in Canada was
convicted of copying innocuous pictures of children from books and catalogs onto a
computer, then using the computer to alter the images to remove the childrens' [sic]
clothing and arrange the children into sexual positions involving children, adults and
even animals." (citing Washington Times, July 23, 1995)); Lee, supra note 37, at 645
("Technical maneuvers that modify adult pornography into virtual child pornography
through scanning and animation are possible through relatively inexpensive computer
software and can be performed without extensive expertise.").
42. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1237, supra note 30 (prepared testimony of Bruce A.
Taylor, President and Chief Counsel, Nat'l Law Ctr. for Children and Families)
("The ... software.., allows the operator to remove pubic hair, shrink the size of the
genitals, breasts, and/or other body parts, adjust skin tones, and otherwise manipulate
the images to create a very convincing piece of child pornography.").
43. See Lee, supra note 37, at 645.
44. Joseph N. Campolo, Note, Childporn. GIF: Establishing Liability for On-Line
Service Providers, 6 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 721,722 n.6 (1996).
Until the late 1970's, pornography was primarily available in magazines and
8mm film loops. It was distributed through the mail, street stalls and
pornographic bookstores in the "bad part of town." The distasteful
locations limited the market. In the 1980's the advent of the VCR was
exploited by pornographers. Consumers could purchase videos and watch
pornography right in their own homes.... Then came the advent of personal
computers..., and a whole new world of pornography access rushed in
through its floodgate.
Id. at 721-22 n.5 (internal citation omitted).
45. Lee, supra note 37, at 644.
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unimaginable amount of pornography [is] available for any on-line
spectator."'
But while the process used to create child pornography is
transforming, many of the attendant harms remain unchanged. The
effect such materials have on "sexual predators.., is the same
whether the child pornography consists of photographic depictions of
actual children or visual depictions produced wholly or in part by
computer."'47 Children are in as great danger of being coerced or
violated as a result of virtual child pornography as with the real
thing.' And the child whose picture was taken surreptitiously while
she waited for the bus will suffer harm to her privacy, reputation, and
psyche when that photograph is morphed into a sexually explicit
depiction.49
Some argue that computer-enhanced or computer-generated
images may pose an even greater harm to children than "traditional"
child pornography." Because technology allows pornography to be
"designed to satisfy the preferences of individual sexual predators,"
the effect it has on pedophiles, and thus the threat it poses to children,
may be magnified. 1 It is also possible, however, that the harms
associated with child pornography will be lessened by these
technological advances, as no children are sexually exploited during
the production of the materials.' At least one thing is certain: the
ability to create pornographic images without using live child models
necessitated a change in existing child pornography laws.53
The harms of child pornography-from the gross exploitation of
children used as models for child pornography, to the abuse suffered
at the hands of pedophiles; whose sexual appetites were whetted by
viewing child pornography, to the invasion of privacy of those
unknowing children whose images are captured by a creator of virtual
child pornography-have compelled the Supreme Court to uphold
various legislative efforts to thwart the child pornography industry.
The next section surveys this line of cases.
46. Madeleine Mercedes Plasencia, Internet Serual Predators: Protecting Children
in the Global Community, 4 J. Gender Race & Just. 15, 16 (2000).
47. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 17 (1996).
48. Id- at 18.
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (Supp. V 1999) (Congressional Findings) (finding
that the privacy interests of children depicted in child pornography are harmed by the
creation and dissemination of such materials).
50. See S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 16.
51. Id.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 229.
53. See infra notes 118-19, 123-26 and accompanying text (discussing the factors
leading to the enactment of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996).
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B. The First Amendment and Child Pornography
Government efforts to combat the evils of child pornography
through criminal statutes aimed at the creators, distributors, and
possessors of such materials have been challenged on First
Amendment grounds. 4 The Supreme Court has upheld statutes of
this nature, however, on the basis that the creation, distribution, and
possession of child pornography are forms of expression wholly
outside the protection of the First Amendment."
While the Constitution ensures that "Congress shall make no
law.., abridging the freedom of speech,"56 the Supreme Court has
long recognized that the First Amendment is not an absolute
guarantee. 7 Speech may be regulated on a content-neutral basis-
that is, via "reasonable time, place, and manner regulations""s not
aimed at suppressing specific ideas-as long as such regulations pass
intermediate judicial scrutiny. 9 Accordingly, such a "regulation will
be sustained under the First Amendment if it advances important
governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of free speech
and does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to
further those interests."6 Even content-based regulations on speech6
54. See, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (Ohio statute prohibiting the
possession of child pornography challenged on grounds that the First Amendment
protects private possession of otherwise unprotected materials); New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747 (1982) (New York statute prohibiting the distribution of materials
depicting sexual performances by minors challenged by defendant bookseller on
grounds that, under the First Amendment, such distribution may be proscribed only
when the materials are obscene).
55. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 103 (upholding an Ohio statute prohibiting the
possession of child pornography); Ferber, 458 U.S. at 747 (upholding a New York
statute prohibiting the distribution of child pornography).
56. U.S. Const. amend. I.
57. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) ("[I]t is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all
circumstances."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) ("That the freedom
of speech which is secured by the Constitution does not confer an absolute right ... is
not open to question.").
58. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
59. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 189 (1997) (citing United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115 (1999) ("A distinct line of cases upholds reasonably-
crafted regulations where the state acts not to suppress certain speech but to direct, in
a content-neutral way, how or when that speech may be expressed in the public
sphere." (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990)).
60. Turner, 520 U.S. at 189 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
61. The Supreme Court has defined a content-based regulation as "any restriction
on speech, the application of which turns on the content of the speech." Boos v.
Barry. 485 U.S. 312, 335-36 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). The difficulty in
differentiating between regulations that are content-neutral and those that are
content-based is acute. For example, "a tax that appears to draw a content-neutral
line between large and small newspapers may in fact be content-based if it turns out
that the large papers all favor one political party and most of the small ones support
2790 [Vol. 69
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willi pass constitutional muster if they are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest-a strict scrutiny test.' - Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has carved out certain categories of expression as
wholly outside the protective grasp of the First Amendment. 3
Regulations of these forms of expression need only pass the Due
Process challenges of overbreadth and vagueness, to which all statutes
are subject.' A statute is constitutionally infirm where its
overbreadth is "not only.., real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep."'" An impermissibly vague
law fails to "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement."'66
The Supreme Court has consistently held obscene speech to be
outside the protection of the First Amendment.' Attempts at
another." Marc A. Franklin et al., Mass Media Law 124 (6th ed. 2000).
62. See Hilton, 167 F.3d at 68 (noting that a content-based regulation "must be (1)
animated by one or more compelling state interests; and (2) narrowly tailored toward
fulfilling those concerns"). The dissent in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno read the
Supreme Court's decisions on child pornography statutes as balancing "the state's
interest in regulating child pornography against the material's limited social value,"
rather than as applying strict scrutiny. 198 F.3d 1083, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting), cert. granted sub non. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876
(2001).
63. See Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942):
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words- those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality.
64. The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[nlo
State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). The Court in Broadrick
expounded on this idea, noting that while regulations impinging on speech,
if too broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent,
there comes a point where that effect-at best a prediction-cannot, with
confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State
from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power
to proscribe.
Id.
66. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). The Court in Kolender further
noted that the interest in preventing arbitrary law enforcement is the "more
important aspect of the vagueness doctrine." Id. at 358.
67. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.");
Chaplinksy, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (noting that obscene speech does not warrant First
Amendment protection); see also supra note 63.
2791
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
defining obscenity have been varied,6' but in Miller v. California, the
Supreme Court announced what remains the constitutional standard
by which to judge materials for obscenity:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the
average person, applying contemporary community standards"
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.69
Accordingly, child pornography found to be obscene under the Miller
standard is considered unprotected speech.70 Moreover, after the
Supreme Court's opinion in New York v. Ferber, child pornography
need not be deemed obscene for its creation or sale to be permissibly
proscribed. 1  In Ferber, the Court enumerated five reasons why
government is "entitled to greater leeway in the regulation of
pornographic depictions of children."72  First, the Court found
manifest the compelling nature of a state's interest in protecting the
"'physical and psychological well-being"'73 of children by preventing
"the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials."74 Second,
noting that the promotion of child pornography is directly linked to
the sexual abuse of children,75 the Court found that the constitutional
standard by which to regulate obscenity set forth in Miller "bears no
connection" to the harm suffered by children in the production of
such works.76 Third, the Court found that the promotion of child
68. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22-23 (1973) (noting the historical trouble
the Supreme Court has had in enunciating a standard for determining whether
material is obscene, and deeming obscene speech "an area in which there are few
eternal verities").
69. Id. at 24 (citations omitted); see also Franklin, supra note 61, at 78 ("In [Miller
v. California], after more than two decades of trying to define obscenity, the Court ...
articulated the definition that remains in effect today.").
70. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 ("This much has been categorically settled by the
Court. that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment."); Vincent
Lodato, Note, Computer-Generated Child Pornography-Exposing Prejudice in Our
First Amendment Jurisprudence?, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1328, 1343-44 (1998)
("Obviously, if [child pornography] is obscene under the Miller standard, Congress
may prohibit its dissemination and receipt regardless of whether the material depicts
[actual] children.").
71. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
72. Id. at 756.
73. Id. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
607 (1982)).
74. Id. at 758.
75. Id. at 759. The Court found at least two ways in which the two are related:
pornographic works serve as a permanent record of the sexual abuse suffered by
children, and the sexual abuse of children for the purposes of creating pornography
depends on a successful distribution network for such materials. Id. See also supra
Part I.A. (discussing the harms associated with child pornography in detail).
76. Ferber, 458 U.S.. at 761.
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pornography is essential to the economic viability of the illicit child
pornography industry.7 Fourth, the Court noted the "exceedingly
modest, if not de minimis" value of child pornography and live sexual
performances by children.7" Finally, the Court determined that
placing child pornography outside the realm of First Amendment
protection did not conflict with precedent. 9 The Ferber decision was
not without its limits, however. As with all regulations impinging on
speech, prohibitions on child pornography must be "adequately
defined."'  Similarly, any statute must contain a requirement of
scienter. 1 The Court further noted that First Amendment protection
remains for the distribution of non-obscene depictions of sexual
activity not involving live performances.'
In response to Ferber, legislatures passed laws prohibiting the
production or sale of child pornography.' Child pornographers, in
turn, took their business underground.0 Ohio's answer to this law-
dodging move by child pornographers was a criminal statute that
prohibited the possession of child pornography.' The Supreme Court
in Osborne v. Ohio upheld the constitutionality of this state law,
rejecting the defendant's argument that the Ohio statute implicated
the right of privacy enunciated in Stanley v. GeorgiaY In Stanley, the
Court had held a Georgia statute that proscribed possession of
obscene material to be unconstitutional, finding "[w]hatever the
power of the state to control public dissemination of ideas inimical to
the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise legislation on
the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts."-" The
Court found the statute at issue in Osborne to be of a different nature,
however; rather than reflecting "a paternalistic interest in regulating
77. Id.
78. Id. at 762. The Court commented on two ways around the statutory
prohibitions for artistic or educational works, noting that adults who looked like
children could be used, as could "[s]imulation outside of the prohibition of the
statute." Id. at 763.
79. Id. at 763-64 ("[lit is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that within the confines of
the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the
expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required.").
80. Id. at 764.
81. Id. at 765. Black's Law Dictionary defines scienter as "[a] degree of
knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her
act or omission." Black's Law Dictionary 1347 (7th ed. 1999).
82. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65.
83. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 26 (1996) (Additional Views of Senator Grassley).
84. Id.; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990) (-[Slince the time of
our decision in Ferber, much of the child pornography market has been driven
underground....")
85. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 106.
86. Id. at 108 (finding the issue in Osborne "distinct" from that in Stanley).
87. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
88. Id. at 566.
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[people's] mind[s]," the Ohio law was an attempt "to destroy a market
for the exploitative use of children." 9 Ferber, therefore, provided the
relevant precedent.'
The Osborne Court broadened the holding in Ferber to allow the
government "to solve the child pornography problem by [doing more
than] attacking production and distribution." 9 In so doing, the Court
recognized several compelling state interests furthered by the Ohio
law. First, the Court noted the importance of protecting children from
the sexual exploitation attendant to the creation of child
pornography.' Next, the Court recognized that child pornography
stands as a permanent record of abuse, thus causing "continuing
harm" to child victims.93 The Court also pointed to pedophiles' use of
child pornography to coax their young victims into sexual behavior. 4
Finally, the Court recognized the need to "stamp out this vice at all
levels in the distribution chain."'95
In an attempt to further the Court-sanctioned government interest
in eradicating child pornography, Congress, faced with new
technologies that facilitate the creation, distribution, and possession of
such materials,96 enacted the CPPA. The following section discusses
the CPPA as a response to Supreme Court precedent and
developments in technology.
C. The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 19969
Congress has passed ever-evolving legislation in attempts to keep
pace with the "particularly pernicious"'98 and highly lucrative99 child
pornography industry. 100 Various Supreme Court rulings and changes
89. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
90. Id. at 109-10. The Osborne dissent found the Court's reliance on Ferber to be
"misplaced," as it was Stanley, not Ferber which "extend[ed] to private possession."
Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent continued:
The authority of a State to regulate the production and distribution of [child
pornography] is not dispositive of its power to penalize possession....
Ferber did nothing more than place child pornography on the same level of
First Amendment protection as obscene adult pornography, meaning that its
production and distribution could be proscribed. The distinction established
in Stanley between what materials may be regulated and how they may be
regulated still stands.
Id. at 139-40.
91. Id. at 110.
92. Id.
93. Id. at ill.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 110.
96. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which
technological advancements have changed the child pornography industry).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999).
98. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 12 (1996).
99. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
100. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
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in the industry have guided these efforts.'" Unfortunately, new ways
for child pornographers to evade prosecution continually emerge."
The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of
197713 criminalized engaging a minor in sexual behavior in order to
create visual depictions to be distributed in interstate or international
commerce. 1°4 As only one person was convicted under the 1977 Act,"'
Congress passed the Child Protection Act of 1984.1' In the 1984 Act,
Congress followed the Supreme Court's precedent in New York v.
Ferber, 7 and proscribed the production, distribution or possession of
child pornography, regardless of whether it was obscene."'  The
language of the 1984 Act reflected the Supreme Court's warning in
Ferber that the "nature of the harm to be combated requires that the
state offense be limited to works that visually depict sexual
conduct."'" Because of the magnitude of not-for-profit trafficking in
child pornography, the 1984 Act did not require that the materials in
question be created or distributed for the purpose of completing a
sale." 0
In 1986 Congress sought new angles in its war on child pornography
with two pieces of major legislation. The Child Sexual Abuse and
Pornography Act of 1986 prohibited advertisements for child
pornography,"' while the Child Abuse Victims' Rights Act of 1986
subjected pornographers to liability for injuries suffered by child
models."2  Congress responded to the proliferation of a new
technology with The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement
granted sub non. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001), for a history
of Congress' attempts to eradicate the child pornography industry.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1087 ("Child pornography is a social concern that has evaded
repeated attempts to stamp it out."); Muntarbhorn, supra note 32, 1 120 ("The
problem [of child pornography] has become more intractable due to the advent of
new technology.... In this regard, the law may be too slow to keep track of
technological developments.").
103. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1977) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2251-2253).
104. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1087.
105. Id. (citing Att'y Gen. Comm'n On Pornography, Final Report 604 (1986)).
106. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2251-2255).
107. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
108. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1088. See supra notes 71-79 and
accompanying text (discussing Ferber's elimination of the requirement of obscenity
for child pornography).
109. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764; see also Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1088
(noting that Congress changed the former statute's term "visual or print medium" to
"visual depiction" (citing Pub. L. No. 98-292, §§ 3,4,98 Stat. 204 (1984))).
110. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1088.
111. Pub. L. No. 99-628, § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2251).
112. Pub. L. No. 99-500, 100 Stat. 1783-74-75 (1986) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2255).
2795
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Act of 1988,113 which outlawed the use of computers to traffic in child
pornography. 114 After the Supreme Court upheld the criminalization
of the mere possession of child pornography in Osborne v. Ohio,115
Congress enacted the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 1990, which prohibited possession of three or
more child pornography items.1 6
The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996117 is Congress' latest
move in this game of legislative cat and mouse. The CPPA is a
response to "high-tech kiddie porn," pornographic images of children
created, altered, recorded, reproduced, or distributed using new
technologies, especially computers." 8 Recognizing the technological
capability of producing, without the use of actual children, sexually
explicit images which are "virtually indistinguishable" from those
created using actual children, Congress re-defined child
pornography. 119 The CPPA prohibits the "production, distribution
and possession"'20 of child pornography, with child pornography
defined in section 2256(8) of the Act as:
Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture,
or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made
or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually
explicit conduct, where-
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to
appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented,
described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the
impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct ....
113. Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7501, 102 Stat. 4485 (1988) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251A-2252).
114. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1088.
115. 495 U.S. 103 (1990); see also supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text(discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Osborne).
116. Pub. L. No. 101-647, §§ 301, 323, 104 Stat. 4816 (1990) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (Supp. V 1999).
118. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
119. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (Supp. V 1999) (providing amended statutory
definition for child pornography).
120. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 7.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (emphasis added).
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Subsection 8's "appears to be" and "conveys the impression"
language 1 2 was added "to close [a] loophole[] in our Federal child
pornography laws caused by advances in computer technology.' '1
Prior laws required the prosecution to show that each piece of child
pornography in question was created using an actual child. 24 The
ability to create convincing child pornography using computers rather
than children made it "virtually impossible" for the government to
meet this burden,"2 thus creating "a reasonable doubt that a picture is
really.., of a real child being molested and exploited."'2 6
With the CPPA, Congress intended to enact a "prohibition [which]
applies to the same type of photographic images already prohibited,
but which [do] not require the use of an actual minor in [their]
production."127  In this way, Congress felt the CPPA would not
criminalize more constitutionally protected speech than necessary,
and would not be deemed impermissibly overbroad.'" To this same
end of avoiding problems of unconstitutional overbreadth, Congress
also included an affirmative defense for traffickers in sexually explicit
material who can show that the materials were produced using adults
and not "pandered as child pornography." 12
In enacting the CPPA, Congress reasoned that computer-generated
child pornography inflicts many of the same harms on children as
pornography created using live children.'- While no children are
necessarily harmed in the process of creating computer-generated
122. Id.
123. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 28 (Additional Views of Senator Biden); see also supra
notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing these technological advances).
124. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 15.
125. Id. at 16.
126. Hearing on S. 1237, supra note 30 (prepared testimony of Bruce A. Taylor,
President and Chief Counsel, Nat'l Law Ctr. for Children and Families). The CPPA
also closed another loophole in federal child pornography legislation caused by the
proliferation of computers. "Since a single computer disk is capable of storing
hundreds of child pornographic images," the CPPA changed the federal proscription
from a ban on "the possession of three or more books, magazines, periodicals, films,
video tapes or other material" containing child pornography, to a ban on the
possession of "three or more inages of child pornography." S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 10
(emphasis added).
127. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 21.
128. Id. (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)).
129. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 10. Section 2252A(c) of the CPPA absolves
defendants charged with the trafficking of child pornography who can prove adults
were used in the production of the pornographic materials. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c)
(Supp. V 1999). Notably, no comparable affirmative defense exists for those arrested
for mere possession of child pornography. At least one court has concluded that such
an affirmative defense is unnecessary and would even be counter-productive to the
goals of the CPPA. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. Section 2252A(d) does
exculpate those charged with possession of child pornography who can show
possession of less than three images and a prompt and good faith attempt to destroy
the images or report their existence to law enforcement agents, however. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2252A(d) (Supp. V 1999).
130. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 15.
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pornography, the effects such materials have, both on pedophiliac
viewers and victim children, are comparable to those of "traditional"
pornography.13 1 Child molesters and pedophiles use child
pornography for self-arousal, and whether or not the materials were
created using live children "is irrelevant because they are perceived as
minors by the [pedophiliac viewer's] psyche."132 Similarly, how the
materials were created is immaterial to the child victims who are
enticed into sexual activity, blackmailed into silence, or persuaded to
recruit more young victims. 133 In short, Congress found, regardless of
how the sexually explicit materials are created, they are "used to
incite pedophiles to molest real children, to seduce real children into
being molested, and to convince real children into making more child
pornography."'"M Congress also found that child pornography which
depicts a recognizable child invades the child's privacy and injures his
reputation. 35
Thus, the CPPA's broadened definition of federally proscribed
child pornography targets harms particular to computer-generated
and computer-enhanced images of child pornography, as well as those
long acknowledged to result from "traditional" child pornography.
Arguing that this expanded definition of child pornography impinges
on their First Amendment rights, several defendants convicted under
the CPPA have challenged the constitutionality of the Act. Part II
surveys the resulting case law.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
132. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 17 (citing written testimony of Dr. Victor Cline, June 4,
1996).
133. Id. at 19; see also supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
134. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 19-20. But see Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d
1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121
S. Ct. 876 (2001) ("Factual studies that establish the link between computer-generated
child pornography and the subsequent sexual abuse of children apparently do not yet
exist. The legislative justification for the proposition was based upon the Final
Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, a report that
predates the existing technology." (citations omitted)).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (Supp. V 1999) (Congressional Findings) (quoting Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 101(a)(7)); see also supra note 49. The Act was not without its
detractors in the Senate, including Senator Feingold, who felt the Act failed to follow
Supreme Court precedent. See S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 36-38 (1996) (Minority Views
of Senator Feingold). Senator Feingold noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has
repeatedly held, in a number of different areas, that expression may not be regulated
solely for its effect upon others." Id. at 37. Senator Feingold found the CPPA to be
an unconstitutional departure from New York v. Ferber, where only "the protection
of the actual children used in the actual production of child pornography [was found]
to warrant the criminalization of non-obscene material." Id. (quoting testimony of
Frederick Schauer before the Senate Judiciary Committee Regarding Proposals to
Amend the Laws on Child Pornography).
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II. TAKING IT TO THE COURTS: DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT
PERMIT REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY?
Litigation ensued not long after the CPPA was enacted. To date,
four appellate courts have heard cases challenging the
constitutionality of the statute. Three circuit courts have found
Congress' broadened definition of child pornography constitutionally
permissible, while one divided court has found the "appears to be '' "#
and "conveys the impression"'37 language of the CPPA violative of the
First Amendment. A discussion of these decisions follows.
A. Guarding First Amendment Principles: The Decision in Free
Speech Coalition v. Reno I'
Under Ferber, child pornography is an unprotected category of
speech, which the government may regulate with impunity. 3' The
controversy before the circuit courts in United States v. Hilton,"'
United States v. Acheson, 4' Free Speech Coalition v. RenoY 2 and
United States v. Mento4 3 was whether the CPPA's language
criminalizing the production, distribution, or possession of images that
"appear[] to be""' of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct
inappropriately broadens this category of speech. The Ninth Circuit
opinion in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno is the only appellate-level
decision to hold the CPPA's broadened definition of child
pornography unconstitutional.'45
Finding that the CPPA is a content-based restriction on speech,"
the Free Speech Coalition court applied strict scrutiny to determine
whether the Act is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.47 The court looked to the Supreme Court's opinion in
Ferber"a to assess the compelling nature of the governmental interest
behind the CPPA: "Nothing in Ferber can be said to justify the
136. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. V 1999): see also supra text accompanying notes
119-26 (discussing this statutory term and the reasons for its inclusion in the CPPA).
137. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (Supp. V 1999): see also supra text accompanying
notes 119-26 (discussing this statutory term and the reasons for its inclusion in the
CPPA).
138. 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub norn. Holder v. Free Speech
Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
139. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
140. 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115 (1999).
141. 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999).
142. 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nor. Holder v. Free Speech
Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
143. 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
145. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1098 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 1091.
147. Id.; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (discussing the strict scrutiny
analysis that is applied to content-based regulations on speech).
148. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
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regulation of [child pornography] other than the protection of the
actual children used in [its] production....""' Because the CPPA
criminalizes images that do not depict an identifiable child, the Free
Speech Coalition court found the Act to be "a significant departure
from Ferber."'50  The court read Ferber as implicitly finding
constitutional protection for "sexually explicit acts involving non-
recognizable minors and... pornography that does not involve
minors."15' Moreover, the court did not find compelling Congress'
interest in curbing the effects child pornography may have on third
parties-the child victims of pedophiles who view sexually explicit
images which appear to depict children. It commented, "[i]f the fact
that speech plays a role in a process of conditioning were enough to
permit governmental regulation, that would be the end of freedom of
speech."'52 The court concluded that absent "a demonstrated basis to
link computer-generated images with harm to real children,"
regulation of such images is unconstitutional.5 3
Having concluded that the CPPA poses an undue burden on First
Amendment freedoms,154 the Free Speech Coalition court turned to
analyze the statute for overbreadth and vagueness. 55 As the Supreme
Court has found in examining a charge of overbreadth, "[w]here a
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such
questions are avoided, [the duty of the courts] is to adopt the
latter." '156 Reiterating its view that restrictions on child pornography
are justified only insofar as they seek to curb a direct harm to
children, the Free Speech Coalition court found the CPPA to be
substantially overbroad. 57
The Supreme Court has stated that a statute is impermissibly vague
when it does not "define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
149. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1092.
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763).
152. Id. at 1093 (quoting Am. Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330
(7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986) (striking a city ordinance which prohibited
pornography portraying women as submissive)).
153. Id. at 1094. The court noted a complete lack of studies connecting computer-
generated child pornography with child molestation, observing that Congress'
suggestion of such a link was based on the Final Report of the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography, which predated the relevant technology. Id. at 1093
(citation omitted).
154. As the court failed to find Congress' interest in using the "appears to be" and
"conveys the impression" language compelling, it did not assess the narrow tailoring
of the statute. Id. at 1095.
155. Id.; see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
156. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware and Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366,408 (1909)).
157. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1096.
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prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary or
discriminatory enforcement.' 158  Accordingly, the Free Speech
Coalition court found the Act's "appears to be" and "conveys the
impression" language to be "highly subjective" and without an
"explicit standard" by which ordinary people can interpret its
prohibitions.'59 This vagueness, the court concluded, allowed for
discretionary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute."
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the CPPA signals an
impermissible shift in legislative intent "from defining child
pornography in terms of the harm inflicted upon real children to a
determination that child pornography [is] evil in and of itself.''6
Judge Ferguson dissented from the majority opinion in Free Speech
Coalition, arguing in accordance with the opinions in United States v.
Hilton, United States v. Acheson, and United States v. Mento, which
upheld the constitutionality of the CPPA. A discussion of these
opinions and Judge Ferguson's dissent in Free Speech Coalition
follows.
B. In Support of the CPPA: Hilton,1 62 Acheson, 6-' Mento,"' and the
Free Speech Coalition Dissent 65
The First, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits upheld the CPPA as a
constitutionally permissible move by Congress to prevent a
technological safe haven for child pornographers and pedophiles.
Expressing a sentiment shared by each of these courts, the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Mento concluded that, while the CPPA is
"bold and innovative in its attempt to combat the sexual exploitation
of minors caused by the trade of child pornography[,J ... [b]oldness
and innovation.., do not render an Act of Congress constitutionally
infirm."'" In so holding, the courts applied strict scrutiny to the
CPPA's restriction on speech, 67  and analyzed the Act for
overbreadth16 and vagueness.'69
158. Id. at 1095 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)): see also
supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's definition of
unconstitutional vagueness).
159. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1095.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 1089.
162. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115
(1999).
163. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999).
164. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
165. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1097-1104 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
166. Mento, 231 F.3d at 923.
167. See infra Part II.B.1. In his dissent to the Ninth Circuit opinion in Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno, Judge Ferguson argued that the constitutionality of the CPPA is
better decided using a balancing approach. 198 F3d at 1101 (Ferguson, J., dissenting)
(citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 756-64 (1982)); see also supra note 62 (describing constitutional tests applied by
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1. First Amendment Analysis of the CPPA's Broadened
Definition of Child Pornography
The Hilton, Acheson, and Mento courts applied strict scrutiny to the
Act's broadened definition of child pornography. 170  The Acheson
court found the government interest served by the CPPA to be
compelling, noting the Supreme Court's declaration that "the
prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse of children constitutes a
government objective of surpassing importance. '171 According to the
Hilton court, new problems such as computer-created pornographic
images of children spark the same compelling governmental interest
as traditional child pornography.17 1 In order to further these
compelling interests, the Hilton court concluded, government must be
allowed to expand its statutory definitions to meet the demands of
expanding technology.173 Recalling the Supreme Court's grant to
government of "greater leeway in the regulation of pornographic
depictions of children," the Acheson court found the statute narrowly
drawn.174 Similarly, the Hilton court noted the Supreme Court
mandate "that government be permitted a certain degree of flexibility
in how it chooses to grapple with new problems presented by the
evolving nature of the child pornography industry." '175
In a similar but more detailed analysis, the Mento court identified
six interests driving Congress to enact the CPPA:
(1) to prevent the use of virtual child pornography to stimulate the
sexual appetites of pedophiles and child sexual abusers; (2) to
destroy the network and market for child pornography; (3) to
prevent the use of pornographic depictions of children in the
seduction or coercion of other children into sexual activity; (4) to
solve the problem of prosecution in those cases where the
government cannot call as a witness or otherwise identify the child
the circuit courts to the CPPA).
168. See infra Part II.B.2.
169. See infra Part II.B.3.
170. See supra notes 62, 167.
171. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ferber,
458 U.S. at 757).
172. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 73 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115
(1999). The court outlined several of the threats to child well-being associated with
virtual child pornography:
[c]omputer-created or enhanced material can be bought, sold, or traded like
any other form of child pornography, adding further fuel to the underground
child pornography industry. It can be used just as effectively as pictures of
actual children to entice or blackmail children into cooperating with would-
be abusers. Moreover, the material may have been created through the
abuse of an actual minor but altered so that it may be impossible to show
that a real child was ever involved in its creation.
Id.
173. Id.
174. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 650 (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756).
175. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 72-73 (citing Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110).
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involved to establish his/her age; (5) to prevent harm to actual
children involved, where child pornography serves as a lasting
record of their abuse; and (6) to prevent harm to children caused by
the sexualization and eroticization of minors in child pornography.'7 6
The Mento court dismissed defendant Mento's argument that, with
the CPPA, the government's interest had moved to censoring certain
ideas, an expansion of interest that would extend beyond the limits
imposed by the Supreme Court in Ferber." "Viewed in the proper
context, Ferber in no way stands for the proposition that permissible
governmental interests in the realm of child pornography would be
forever restricted to the harm suffered by identifiable children
participating in its production."'78 Rather, the Mento court found that
Ferber's limitations were pertinent to "less graphic material" such as
cartoons and drawings,' 79 and the Mento court echoed the Hilton and
Acheson opinions which emphasized the Supreme Court's call for
flexibility in allowing the government to tackle new problems in the
child pornography industry as they arise.""'
Concluding that the government's interest in protecting children
from the harms associated with child pornography is compelling, the
Mento court turned to the second prong of its strict scrutiny analysis:
whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.",
Specifically, the court examined whether the CPPA's "appears to be"
language is "'the least restrictive means to further [its] articulated
interest." '' 1 Noting Congress' findings regarding the effects of child
pornography on pedophiles and children,' the court maintained "[t]o
the viewer, there is no difference betveen a picture of an actual child
and what 'appears to be' a child."1  Moreover, the Mento court
agreed with the First Circuit that Congress needs the "appears to be"
language to keep the child pornography industry from hiding behind
technological advancements.lss Thus, the Mento court found the
CPPA to be the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling
interest of protecting children from the harmful effects of child
pornography.
176. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918-19 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Hilton, 167
F.3d at 66-67).
177. Mento, 231 F.3d at 919.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 919 n.8.
180. Id. at 919-20.
181. Id at 920; see also supra note 62 (outlining the strict scrutiny analysis used by
the Mento, Hilton, and Acheson courts).
182. Mento, 231 F.3d at 920 (quoting Sable Communications of Calif., Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115,126 (1989)).
183. Congress found that child molesters and pedophiles use child pornography for
self-arousal and to "seduc[e] or break[] down [a] child's inhibitions to sexual abuse or
exploitation." Id at 920 (quoting 110 Stat. 3009-26, -27).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 920-21.
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In his dissent to the Free Speech Coalition opinion, Judge Ferguson
embarked on a slightly different First Amendment analysis of the
CPPA. Judge Ferguson believed that the proper inquiry under the
Supreme Court's previous opinions "is to weigh the state's interest in
regulating child pornography against the material's limited social
value."'86 Ferguson's dissent listed four reasons for disagreeing with
the majority's determination that "[o]nce 'actual children' are
eliminated from the equation... Congress is impermissibly trying to
regulate 'evil idea[s]." ' 18 First, the dissent pointed to the Supreme
Court's opinion in Osborne v. Ohio for the proposition that the
government has a compelling interest in protecting children other
than those who are actually depicted in pornography.188 Next, the
dissent noted that the Supreme Court has sanctioned some of
Congress' justifications for passing the CPPA, such as preventing child
molesters from seducing their victims with photos of other children
engaged in sexual activity.18 9 Third, the dissent recalled the Supreme
Court's grant of flexibility to government in promoting the general
well-being of children. 190  Fourth, the dissent stressed, "child
pornography, real or virtual, has little or no social value."''
Having concluded that the CPPA does not violate the First
Amendment, the Hilton, Acheson, and Mento courts, as well as the
dissent in Free Speech Coalition, turned to the challenges of the Act as
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.
2. The Overbreadth Challenge
As the Acheson court recognized, the overbreadth doctrine is
"strong medicine,"'" applicable only where a statute is incapable of
constitutionally sound interpretation. 93 With this mandate in mind,
the courts looked to the legislative record of the CPPA to define the
Act's scope.'94 That record revealed Congress' intention to extend the
federal prohibition of child pornography to images which are
186. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876
(2001) (citing Ohio v. Osborne, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747,756-64 (1982)).
187. Id. at 1098 (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 1098-99 (citing Osborne, 495 U.S. at 108, 111; United States v. Hilton,
167 F.3d 61, 70 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115 (1999)).
189. Id. at 1099 (citing Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West Supp.
1999), Historical and Statutory Notes, Congressional Findings, at 3).
190. Id. at 1099-1100 (citing Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57).
191. Id. at 1100 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762).
192. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973)).
193. Id. at 650 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24); see also supra notes 65, 156 and
accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of overbreadth).
194. See United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 921 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Hilton, 167 F.3d 61,72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115 (1999).
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"virtually indistinguishable" from those of real children.' The Mento
court noted Congress' explanation that "'[t]he appears to be language
applies to the same type of photographic image already prohibited,
but which does not require the use of an actual minor in its
production."'1 96 The Acheson court noted that this expansion in scope
is justified by Congress' legitimate interest in protecting those children
harmed by child pornography in ways other than by use as live
models."9  Similarly, in his dissent to the Free Speech Coalition
opinion, Judge Ferguson found the CPPA's prohibition on
pornographic images "easily mistaken for real photographs of real
children" to be a permissibly narrow extension of judicially approved
child pornography statutes.198
The Mento court recognized that by criminalizing images not
created with live child models, the CPPA "prohibits material that is
predominantly the product of the creator's imagination-an array of
complex computer images whose composition requires a degree of
artistic skifl.1' 19 The court was not troubled by this, however, finding
minimal social value in expression of this kind.2°
The courts did not find impermissible overbreadth in the possibility
of mistaken prosecution for possession or distribution of images using
young-looking adult models. The Act's affirmative defense for
traffickers in such material who can prove that the models used were
of majority age weighed against a finding of overbreadth'~ Although
the Mento court noted that this defense is unavailable to those who
merely possess such material, the court nevertheless concluded that
remedying this "slight risk" of wrongful conviction would thwart
Congress' compelling interest in eradicating the market for child
pornography.' The Acheson court likewise concluded that "the
legitimate scope of the statute dwarfs the risk of impermissible
applications," and the court stressed the availability of case-specific
remedies for any misapplications which might arise."- 3
195. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, at pt. I, IV(B)); Hilton,
167 F.3d at 72 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, at pt. I, IV(B)). The Hilton court went
on to explain, "[it follows [from the legislative record] that drawings, cartoons,
sculptures, and paintings depicting youthful persons in sexually explicit poses plainly
lie beyond the reach of the Act." Hilton, 167 F.3d at 72.
196. Mento, 231 F.3d at 921 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, at pt. IV(C)).
197. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651.
198. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nonL. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876
(2001).
199. Mento, 231 F.3d at 921.
200. Id. (citing Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73).
201. See id.; Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1102; Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651.
202. Mento, 231 F.3d at 921-22. The Mento court reasoned that a similar defense
for mere possessors of child pornography "would do nothing to prevent the sexual
exploitation of teenagers and other minors, and it would permit the market for child
pornography to thrive." Id. at 922.
203. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 652; see also Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1102
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The Acheson court acknowledged that in Ferber, the Supreme
Court suggested that "'a person over the statutory age who perhaps
looked younger' could be used to make an otherwise illegal
performance [legal]. ' '2°  But the Acheson court found that Ferber's
recognition of the "exceedingly modest, if not de minimis" value of
sexually explicit depictions of children failed to outweigh any remote
hypothetical concerns of erroneous conviction.25 The Acheson court
found further relief from overbreadth in the CPPA's scienter
requirement.2 6 Because the prosecution must prove knowledge on
the part of the defendant that the materials in question depict minors,
the Act's scienter requirement provides an incentive for the
government to prosecute only where the images in question are "of
pre-pubescent children or persons who otherwise clearly appear to be
under the age of 18. 207
In sum, the First, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits, along with a
dissenting judge in the Ninth Circuit, determined "the CPPA does not
burden substantially more material than necessary."20
3. The Void for Vagueness Challenge
Mindful that "[a]n ambiguous law fails to provide the requisite
notice and undermines public confidence that the laws are equally
enforced,'29 the courts also assessed the CPPA for constitutionally
210impermissible vagueness.
In ruling on a CPPA conviction, the Hilton court noted, a jury is
asked to look at the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a reasonable viewer would consider the sexual depiction in
question to involve a minor.211  This, the court concluded, is an
objective inquiry, and can be proven using objective evidence, thus
lessening the likelihood of arbitrary enforcement of the CPPA.12 The
(noting that other possible misapplications not specifically accounted for in the statute
should be dealt with "on a case-by-case[] basis," rather than by invalidating any
particular clause) (Ferguson, J., dissenting); Hilton, 167 F.3d at 74 ("The existence of
a few possibly impermissible applications of the Act does not warrant its
condemnation.").
204. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763
(1982)).
205. Id. (quoting Ferber, 458 U.S. at 774).
206. Id. at 651-52; see also supra note 81 (providing a definition of scienter).
207. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 651-52 (quoting Hilton, 167 F.3d at 73).
208. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 922 (4th Cir. 2000).
209. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75. When the law is aimed at expression, the court noted,
this danger is magnified: "[A] poorly-worded statute, 'may well cause speakers to
remain silent rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and
images."' Id. (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997)).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 158 (quoting the Supreme Court's
definition of an impermissibly vague law).
211. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75.
212. Id. The Hilton court listed various means by which a depicted person's age
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Acheson court suggested that the pornographic materials themselves
could offer objective evidence as to the age of the children depicted,
for example through the names of their image files.1 3 Similarly, the
Mento court found that the Act's "appears to be" language provides
an objective rather than capricious standard by which to judge a
particular defendant.2 4
The CPPA's scienter requirement provided an additional safeguard
against arbitrary enforcement.215 The scienter requirement, the courts
felt, assures convictions only where the government can show the
defendant knowingly possessed what he believed to be sexually
explicit material depicting a minor.1 6 Because of this requirement,
the Hilton court announced that,
a defendant who honestly believes that the individual depicted in the
image appears to be 18 years old or older... , or who can show that
he knew the image was created by having a youthful-looking adult
pose for it, must be acquitted, so long as the image was not
presented or marketed as if it contained a real minor.217
The Mento and Hilton courts also considered the relevant statutory
definitions to assess the clarity of the CPPA's prohibitions. The
Mento court found the CPPA explicit in its definition of child
pornography,218 the word minor,21 9 and the type of sexual conduct
forbidden under the Act.' 2  The Mento court also surveyed the
legislative record, and determined that the Act's "appears to be"
language was meant to target only those images which are "virtually
indistinguishable" from true child pornography."' Similarly, the
could be objectively proven, namely
the physical characteristics of the person; expert testimony as to the physical
development of the depicted person; how the disk, file, or video was labeled
or marked by the creator or the distributor of the image, or the defendant
himself; and the manner in which the image was described, displayed, or
advertised.
Id (citation omitted).
213. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 652-53 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Hilton.
167 F.3d at 61). The Acheson court listed by way of example some of the names of
the image files found in the defendant's possession, including "SEXKD00IJPG."
"08with15.jpg," and "llrape.jpg." Id at 653 & n.2.
214. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 922 (4th Cir. 2000); accord Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno, 198 F3d 1083, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), cert.
granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
215. Mento, 231 F.3d at 922; Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1103; Acheson, 195
F.3d at 652-53; Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75.
216. See, e.g., Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75.
217. ld; accord Acheson, 195 F.3d at 653.
218. See infra note 266 (providing the CPPA's definition of child pornography).
219. The CPPA defines a minor as "any person under the age of eighteen years."
18 U.S.C. § 2256(1) (1994).
220. Mento, 231 F.3d at 922. See infra note 265 (providing the CPPA's definition of
sexually explicit conduct).
221. Mento, 231 F.3d at 922 (quoting S. Rep. No. 104-358, at pts. I, IV(B) (1996)).
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Hilton court found the statute's definitions to be clear, and its scope
appropriately limited to visual images.2
The Mento and Hilton courts read the CPPA's affirmative defenses
as further security against mistaken convictions and arbitrary
enforcement of the Act.' Moreover, where "there are few equally
efficacious alternatives" the Hilton court found no grounds to
overturn the statute as vague.224
The First, Eleventh, and Fourth circuits thus upheld the
constitutionality of the CPPA, finding that the statute "neither
impinges substantially on protected expression nor is so vague as to
offend due process. "225 The dissent in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno
argued for a similar outcome.226
Part III of this Note disagrees with the appellate opinions in Hilton,
Acheson, and Mento, and argues that the Free Speech Coalition court
was correct in finding the CPPA to be constitutionally infirm. In
criminalizing more than that child pornography which harms actual
children, the CPPA extends beyond the Supreme Court-sanctioned
interest of protecting children and censors expression protected by the
First Amendment. This Note proposes an amendment to assure that
the Act's focus remains on protecting children rather than eradicating
disfavored ideas.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ILLS OF THE CPPA AND
A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Unquestionably, children harmed by child pornography are harmed
severely.27 But not all child pornography necessarily harms children.
While advancements in technology have frustrated law enforcement
officials working to protect children from the pestilence of child
pornography,' these same developments have made it possible for
pedophiles to gratify their desires without hurting actual children.? 9
222. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 76.
223. Mento, 231 F.3d at 922; Hilton, 167 F.3d at 75-76; see also supra note 129
(discussing the Act's affirmative defenses).
224. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 76 (rejecting defendant's suggestion that the statutory
language be changed to apply to images of persons who are or appear to be
"physically sexually immature," as such construction would exclude those minors who
appear "physically sexually mature" from statutory protection).
225. Id. at 65.
226. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876
(2001).
227. See supra Part I.A.
228. See supra note 102, text accompanying notes 119-126.
229. See Burke, supra note 39, at 464-65 ("There may be a strong correlation
between the consumption of pornography and the perpetration of sexual crimes
against children; however, there is not necessarily a causal relationship. In fact,
viewing virtual child pornography may produce the opposite effect and alleviate the
desire to pursue actual children."). But see Lee, supra note 37, at 668-69 (rejecting the
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Consider the man who uses pornographic images of children not as
a prelude to sexual activity with minors but as a tool for masturbation.
If this man who looks but doesn't touch views an image that involved
no actual children in its creation, arguably he has harmed no one by
his choice of self-arousal.2-0 The law cannot, in keeping with the
Constitution, refuse to acknowledge that this hypothetical man may
exist.
Because the CPPA makes no allowance for this man and the type of
child pornography he views, it reaches beyond the protection of
children and seeks to criminalize and censor unpleasant speech. In
this way, this Note argues, the Act is unconstitutional. "3 While this
Note agrees with the Circuit Courts in United States v. Hilton,'
United States v. Acheson,.- 3 and United States v. Mento--4 and the
dissent in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno ' that the CPPA is not
unconstitutionally vague,236 it argues that the Act's expanded
definition of child pornography is overbroad "7 and works as an
impermissible infringement on First Amendment freedoms. - The
Act can be brought within the limits of the Constitution, however, by
amending its terms to assure that its focus remains on the compelling
government interest of protecting children from the harms of child
pornography. One possible solution, an affirmative defense for
defendants who can show that no children are harmed by the child
pornography at issue, is proposed below. - 9
"safety-valve theory," which posits that child pornography can act as an outlet for
pedophiliac desires, and stating that "[l]ike real child pornography, virtual child
pornography may be used by perpetrators to override their own knowledge that what
they are doing is abusive. [It] can normalize abuse by suggesting that it is the children
who want the sexual activity."); Plasencia, supra note 46, at 17 (discussing the process
of "virtual validation," whereby "[s]upported and encouraged fantasy triggers action
in the real world. Provocative images of child pornography, stories of sex and other
community-supported chat bolster and empower a pedophile's sense of self. The
pedophile, in return, is more likely to act," ).
230. It can be argued that such a person is harming himself by deriving pleasure
from materials most of society would find morally repugnant. But the Supreme Court
has explicitly renounced government's "paternalistic," Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
109 (1990), interest in "controlling a person's private thoughts." Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557,566 (1969).
231. See infra Part III.A. (discussing the constitutional infirmities of the CPPA).
232. 167 F3d 61 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 115 (1999).
233. 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999).
234. 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
235. 198 F.3d 1083, 1097-1104 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), cert.
granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
236. See infra Part III.A.2; see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the conclusions in
Hilton, Acheson, Mento, and the Free Speech Coalition dissent that the CPPA is not
impermissibly vague).
237. See infra Part III.A.3.
238. See infra Part III.A.1.
239. See infra Part III.B (proposing an amendment to the CPPA to satisfy the
demands of the First Amendment and Due Process).
2809
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
A. The CPPA As Written Is Unconstitutional
All creators of child pornography do not create equally. Some
sexually exploit children to create their product, while others use only
computers. The CPPA treats all producers of child pornography the
same, however. Similarly, the CPPA assumes that all possessors of
child pornography will sexually abuse children, making no allowance
for the viewer of child pornography whose experience ends with the
image before him. In this way, the CPPA is unconstitutionally
overbroad and an impermissible impingement on First Amendment
rights.
1. The CPPA Impinges on the First Amendment Guarantee of
Freedom of Expression
The CPPA enters into territory protected by the First Amendment
by regulating speech solely because it is distasteful. The Supreme
Court has explicitly negated such legislation: "If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society
finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 4 ' Or as famed
pornographer Larry Flynt stated, "[f]reedom of [the] press is not...
freedom for the thought you love the most. It's freedom for the
thought you hate the most." 41
The Supreme Court opinions in Ferber and Osborne recognized
child pornography as outside the realm of First Amendment
protection. 42 The Ferber and Osborne Courts were not motivated by
a desire to stamp out disfavored speech, however. Rather, the
Supreme Court's focus appropriately remained on the harm inflicted
on children by child pornography. In Ferber, the Court found the
government interest in preventing the exploitation of children in the
creation of child pornography to be an "objective of surpassing
importance, '243 noting that that "interest is limited to ... utilizing or
photographing children."1 42  Courts such as the Fourth Circuit in
Mento, which found that the limitation outlined in Ferber "was meant
to limit regulation to those images that appear to be actual
pornographic photographs,I245 read too much into Ferber.2 " As the
majority in Free Speech Coalition noted, "[n]othing in Ferber can be
240. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989).
241. Burke, supra note 39, at 439.
242. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court
opinions in Ferber and Osborne).
243. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,757 (1982).
244. Id. at 763.
245. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 919 n.8 (4th Cir. 2000).
246. But see id. at 919 (concluding that defendant Mento's reading of Ferber as
"limit[ing] appropriate government interests to those designed to keep real children
from being victimized by pornographers... interprets Ferber too narrowly").
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said to justify the regulation of such materials other than the
protection of the actual children used in the production of child
pornography. '247 While the Supreme Court in Ferber did recognize
the need for flexibility on the part of government in regulating child
pornography,2 48 the justification for such legislative leeway lay solely
in protecting actual children from the harms associated with posing
for child pornography. 24
9
In Osborne, the Supreme Court recognized that child pornography
does not just harm its child subjects, and held that a criminal
prohibition on the mere possession of child pornography survived
constitutional scrutiny.25 Along with the government interest in
preventing the exploitation of children, 1 and the interest in
destroying the market for child pornography,22 the Osborne Court
was influenced by two more indirect harms associated with child
pornography. Specifically, the Court pointed to the permanent record
of abuse child pornography creates, traumatizing child victims years
after their abuse has ended, 3 and the possible use of child
pornography by pedophiles as a tool for seducing young victims.
On balance, the Osborne Court concluded, these harms weighed in
favor of allowing government to regulate private possession of child
pornography. 5 Thus, courts looking to prohibit child pornography
for reasons other than the harms it directly inflicts on its child subjects
must look to Osborne.
Where the child pornography in question is "virtual," the scales tip
in a different direction than under the facts of Osborne. Not all of the
factors relied upon by the Osborne Court in upholding a prohibition
on the private possession of child pornography are present for virtual
child pornography, thus upsetting the delicate balance between the
government interest in protecting children and the Constitution's
mandate that individual rights remain protected. No children are
sexually exploited in the creation of virtual child pornography.
247. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted sub nor. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
248. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
249. See id. at 757 (noting that "[t]he prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse
of children constitutes a governmental objective of surpassing importance"); supra
notes 72-79 and accompanying text (discussing the five reasons the Ferber Court gave
for finding child pornography categorically outside the protection of the First
Amendment).
250. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). See supra notes 85-95 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's opinion in Osborne in greater
detail).
251. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109.
252. Id. at 110.
253. ld. at ill.
254. Id.
255. See id. ("Given the gravity of the State's interests in this context, we find that
Ohio may constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child
pornography.").
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Similarly, where the materials in question do not depict a recognizable
child, no child suffers the emotional trauma of knowing pornographic
images of him are circulating among pedophiles. Finally, allowing
virtual child pornography arguably discourages a market for
"traditional" child pornography which exploits actual children. 6
While computer-generated child pornography that does not require
the use of actual children for its creation can still be used by
pedophiles as a tool of seduction, this factor alone is not sufficient to
overcome the First Amendment.
Where no actual children are abused and no identifiable children
are depicted, the harms to children by virtual child pornography are
entirely speculative. The majority in Free Speech Coalition noted a
lack of a proven link between virtual child pornography and actual
sexual abuse of children, 7 stating further that the report relied on by
Congress in enacting the CPPA "shows that the use of sexually
explicit photos or films of actual children to lure other children played
a small part in the overall problem involving harm to children." 8 The
Free Speech Coalition court continued, "[m]any innocent things can
entice children into immoral or offensive behavior, but that reality
does not create a constitutional power in the Congress to regulate
otherwise innocent behavior." 9
Accordingly, the Osborne factors weigh in favor of finding the
CPPA as written to be an unconstitutional prohibition of First
Amendment expression. An inquiry into the constitutionality of the
CPPA must also determine whether or not the Act is impermissibly
256. See infra notes 298-300 and accompanying text (arguing that the affirmative
defense proposed in this Note allows for a shift in the child pornography industry
towards images which do not involve actual or identifiable children for their creation).
257. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted sub nom. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001) ("[Tlhere [is
no] demonstrated basis to link computer-generated images with harm to real
children."); see also Ronald W. Adelman, The Constitutionality of Congressional
Efforts to Ban Computer-Generated Child Pornography: A First Amendment
Assessment of S. 1237, 14 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 483, 490 (1996) ("Factual
studies concerning the link between computer-generated child pornography and
subsequent sexual abuse of children do not yet exist."). Apparently there are still no
studies demonstrating a connection between virtual child pornography and harm to
actual children. In 2000, the Fourth Circuit cited no study for its conclusion that, "[tlo
the viewer, there is no difference between a picture of an actual child and what
,appears to be' a child, [and that] depictions that are represented to be minors are
harmful in the same way as any child pornography, except that there is no minor
involved in their production." United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 920 (4th Cir.
2000).
258. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1094 (citing Attorney Gen. Comm'n on
Pornography, Final Report 604, 649-50 (1986)). But see infra text accompanying note
298 (noting the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in United States v. Mento that permitting
possession of pornographic materials that do not depict identifiable children would
frustrate efforts to protect children).
259. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1094 n.7.
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overbroad or vague.' In subsections 2 and 3 below, this Note argues
that while the CPPA is not impermissibly vague, its extended
definition of child pornography is fatally overbroad.
2. The CPPA is Not Unconstitutionally Vague
A criminal statute such as the CPPA is impermissibly vague where
it does not "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness
that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in
a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." 261 Of these two interests furthered by the void-for-
vagueness doctrine, the interest in preventing arbitrary law
enforcement is the most crucial.2 2
This Note argues in accordance with the opinions in United States v.
Hilton, United States v. Acheson, and United States v. Mento, and the
dissent in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno that the CPPA is not
unconstitutionally vague.263 A jury or judge ruling on a CPPA
conviction engages in an objective inquiry using objective evidence to
determine whether a reasonable viewer would consider the
pornographic materials in question to depict a minor.' The statutory
definitions are unambiguous, providing a detailed list of conduct
considered "sexually explicit," 265 a clear description of when visual
depictions of such conduct will be considered child pornography,2t1
and a thorough explanation of the term "identifiable minor. "'67
Moreover, the legislative record indicates that only those images
which are "virtually indistinguishable" 2  from previously proscribed
child pornography are to be targeted .269  The CPPA's affirmative
260. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
261. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,357 (1983).
262. See supra note 66.
263. See supra notes 209-26 and accompanying text (discussing the conclusions in
Hilton, Acheson, Mento, and the Free Speech Coalition dissent that the CPPA is not
impermissibly vague).
264. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
265. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (1994) (defining such conduct as "actual or simulated ...
sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal,
whether between persons of the same or opposite sex: bestiality; masturbation;
sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of
any person").
266. See id. § 2256(8) (Supp. V 1999) (defining child pornography as a visual
depiction of sexually explicit conduct involving an actual minor, what -appears to be"
an actual minor, or "an identifiable minor," or sexually explicit materials marketed to
"convey[] the impression that [they] contain[] a visual depiction of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct").
267. Id. § 2256(9)(A). Section 2256(9)(A) defines a depiction of an identifiable
minor as an image of a minor "who is recognizable as an actual person by the person's
face, likeness, or other distinguishing characteristic, such as a unique birthmark or
other recognizable feature." Id § 2256(9)(A)(ii).
268. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 195-98.
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defenses and requirement of scienter further protect defendants
against arbitrary arrests and convictions. 270 Under section 2252A(c),
those arrested for trafficking in child pornography can defend against
the charges by demonstrating that the materials in question were
produced using adults rather than children, and that they were not
marketed as portraying children.27 1 Defendants charged with mere
possession are also protected by an affirmative defense which
exculpates those who possessed fewer than three images of child
pornography and acted promptly to destroy the materials or turn
them over to law enforcement officials.72 Thus, only true child
pornographers or knowing possessors of child pornography are
targeted by the Act. Similarly, the Act's requirement of scienter
ensures that only those defendants who willfully violate the statute
will be convicted, by making knowledge an element of any charge
under the CPPA.273
While the CPPA is not unconstitutionally vague, it does impinge on
more protected expression than is necessary to reach its stated interest
of protecting children from harm. A discussion of the Act's
overbreadth follows.
3. The CPPA is Unconstitutionally Overbroad
Because the CPPA prohibits more protected expression than
necessary, it is unconstitutionally overbroad. The CPPA's
overbreadth is "not only... real, but substantial as well, judged in
relation to [its] plainly legitimate sweep. "274
The Supreme Court has clearly delineated the legitimate scope of
any anti-child pornography legislation as lying in the protection of real
children from harm.275 But the CPPA criminalizes more than speech
which harms children; it criminalizes disfavored ideas. The Mento
court recognized this shortcoming of the CPPA when it noted that the
Act "prohibits material that is predominantly the product of the
creator's imagination." 276 That court's conclusion that such concerns
do not impinge on First Amendment freedoms because "'there is
little, if any, social value in this type of expression277 underestimates
the importance of freedom of expression, however. Rather, as the
270. See supra notes 129, 201-02,206-07 and accompanying text.
271. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (Supp. V 1999).
272. Id. § 2252A(d).
273. See, e.g. id. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (providing that any person who "knowingly"
possesses child pornography will be punished under the CPPA).
274. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973). See supra note 65 and
accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the overbreadth doctrine as
outlined by the Supreme Court in Broadrick.
275. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
opinions in Ferber and Osborne).
276. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 921 (4th Cir. 2000).
277. Id. (quoting United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 73 (1st Cir. 1999)).
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Free Speech Coalition court noted, "while such images are
unquestionably morally repugnant, they do not involve real children
nor is there a demonstrated basis to link computer-generated images
with harm to real children[, and the CPPA thus] does not withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 2 78
Because the CPPA could be amended to keep its proscriptions
within the limits outlined by the Supreme Court and dictated by the
Constitution, it is substantially and impermissibly overbroad. One
such amendment is proposed below.
B. Proposed Amendment to the CPPA
The CPPA's constitutional flaws are easily resolved. This Note
argues for the addition of an affirmative defense for defendants who
can prove that no actual children were harmed by the child
pornography in question. The addition of such an affirmative defense
would cure the Act of overbreadth, eliminate the conflict between the
Act and the First Amendment, and eradicate any vestigial threats of
arbitrary law enforcement. 79 Proposed section 2252A(e) of the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, would read as follows:
(e)It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating
paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4) or (5) of subsection (a) that -
(i) the alleged child pornography was produced wholly without the
use of actual children;
(ii) the alleged child pornography was advertised, promoted,
presented, described, or distributed so as to convey the impression
that it was produced wholly without the use of actual children; and
(iii) no identifiable child is depicted in the alleged child
pornography.
This affirmative defense would allow anyone apprehended for
knowingly sending, receiving, distributing, reproducing, selling, or
possessing child pornography8 to absolve him or herself by proving
that the materials in question did not and do not harm actual children.
The affirmative defense proposed here targets all of the harms
inflicted by child pornography on its child models,"' be they live or
computer-manipulated models, while respecting the protected status
of expression which harms no actual children. A similar defense has
been suggested by at least one other commentator, Samantha L.
278. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted sub non. Holder v. Free Speech Coalition, 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
279. See supra Part III.A (discussing the constitutional shortcomings of the CPPA).
280. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (a) (Supp. V 1999).
281. See supra Part I.A.
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Friel.2" Friel's proposed amendment creates a rebuttable
presumption that visual depictions of children engaged in sexual
activity are child pornography, and provides an affirmative defense to
those who can show by clear and convincing evidence that the images
do not depict actual children. 83 The differences between the
amendment proposed by Friel and the one proposed in this Note are
significant, however.
The amendment proposed here is modeled after the CPPA's
existing affirmative defense for defendants who can show that the
materials in question were produced using adults and were not
marketed as child pornography. "I Accordingly, this Note's proposed
amendment requires a showing that the materials were not promoted
as "real" child pornography. This requirement assures that
defendants do not benefit from accidentally stumbling upon virtual
child pornography when searching for actual child pornography, and
discourages the creation of child pornography that harms actual
children.2 8 5
Moreover, the amendment proposed here recognizes Congress'
concern for the children whose innocent photos were turned into
pornography, by requiring defendants to prove that the children
depicted in the materials are not identifiable. In enacting the CPPA,
Congress found that "child pornography which includes an image of a
recognizable minor invades the child's privacy and reputational
interests, since images that are created showing a child's face or other
identifiable feature on a body engaging in sexually explicit conduct
can haunt the minor for years to come."286
Friel's amendment, on the other hand, does not require a defendant
to show that no identifiable minor is depicted in the pornographic
282. Friel, supra note 21, at 261. Friel's Note proposed including the following
language to the CPPA:
(5) Any film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual reproduction or
depiction by computer which appears on its face to depict a child engaged in
any activity described in this section shall be presumed to be child
pornography for purposes of this Section.
(6)(A) It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of child pornography
that each subject of the film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual
reproduction or depiction by computer was not a real child under the age of
eighteen (18) engaged in sexual activity, but was, rather, a computer-created
image of an imaginary person, or a computer-manipulated image of a real
person, or that the child was, in fact, eighteen (18) years of age or older.
(B) The defendant shall bear the burden of rebutting, by clear and
convincing evidence, the presumption contained in subsection (a)(5) so as to
rely on this affirmative defense.
Id.
283. Id.
284. See supra text accompanying note 129 (discussing this defense, § 2252A(c)).
285. See infra text accompanying notes 299,306.
286. 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (Supp. V 1999) (Congressional Findings) (quoting Pub.
L. No. 104-208, § 101(a)).
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materials in question, noting that "[p]erhaps it is better to leave issues,
such as privacy and defamation, to the civil courts."'- Friel finds it
"unlikely that a state's interest in preventing a potential mental harm
will be enough to justify the expansion of [the definition of child
pornography] to include virtual child pornography of real children."'
Conversely, this Note argues that the protection of a child's privacy
and reputation is compelling, and that a criminal statute aimed at
child pornography should-and under the Constitution may-address
this interest. As Senator Biden noted,
there is wide agreement that expanding current law to prohibit
visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct in which an identifiable
minor's likeness is recognizable meets current constitutional
requirements, even where the minor was not actually engaged in
sexual conduct .... These kinds of images cause significant harm to
real children because, although the minor depicted may not have
actually engaged in sexual conduct, the image creates an apparent
record of sexual abuse and thus causes the same psychological harm
to children (in fact, using a minor's likeness in such a depiction could
reasonably be considered a form of abuse). - 9
Recent technological developments have made it possible to create
child pornography without the use of live children, thus potentially
reducing the physical sexual abuse of children associated with the
creation of child pornography.291 If an identifiable child is depicted in
computer-created pornography, however, that child has still been
abused. The prevention of such psychological sexual abuse is no less
compelling an interest than the prevention of physical sexual abuse-a
position supported by Supreme Court precedent. -9t
Amending the CPPA to include a defense such as the one proposed
here furthers the state interests validated by the Supreme Court in
287. Friel, supra note 21, at 239.
288. Id. at 237.
289. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 30 (1996) (Additional Views of Senator Biden).
Senator Biden proposed adding a separate provision to the CPPA to "prohibit[] only
those visual depictions that have been created, adapted, or modified to make it
appear that an identifiable minor was engaged in sexually explicit conduct." Id. at 11.
Because the Act is severable, 18 U.S.C. § 2251 note (Supp. V 1999) (Severability), this
proposed provision would have remained intact in the event of judicial invalidation of
the CPPA's broadened definition of child pornography. See S. Rep. No. 104-358, at
28-32 (Additional Views of Senator Biden) (providing the rationale behind Senator
Biden's proposed provision).
290. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text (discussing the technological
developments which led to the enactment of the CPPA).
291. See Adelman, supra note 257, at 486 (noting that the Supreme Court in Ferber
"focused on... harm to the subjects [of child pornography]"). But see New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764-65 (1982) ("[The distribution of descriptions or other
depictions of sexual conduct... which do not involve live performance or
photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First
Amendment protection." (emphasis added)).
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Ferber and Osborne.21 In Ferber, the Court found it "evident beyond
the need for elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the
physical and psychological well-being of a minor' is 'compelling."' 93
The Court continued, "[t]he legislative judgment.., that the use of
children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.., easily
passes muster under the First Amendment." 94 In upholding a ban on
the possession of child pornography, the Supreme Court in Osborne
pointed to the harmful psychological effects of child pornography on
its child subjects: "The pornography's continued existence causes the
child victims continuing harm by haunting the children in years to
come." 195 Accordingly, the affirmative defense proposed in this Note
targets the physical and psychological harms to those children used in
the creation of child pornography, whether the children are used as
live models or their innocent likenesses are manipulated by computers
to produce pornography.
Adding the affirmative defense proposed in this Note to the CPPA
would close a striking gap in congressional logic. The CPPA as
written provides an affirmative defense for those who can prove the
pornographic materials in question (1) depict only people of majority
age and (2) were not marketed as depicting children. 96 In including
this defense, Congress recognized that not all pornographic materials
which appear to depict children harm children.29 But Congress failed
to follow this notion through by allowing a defense for those who
enjoy looking at sexually explicit depictions of children, but would
292. See Lee, supra note 37, at 678 (arguing that an affirmative defense under
which defendants must demonstrate "that [the] child pornography in their possession
is neither real, nor advertised as being real, nor of an identifiable minor.., should
allow courts to regulate virtual child pornography without radically departing from
Ferber's definition of child pornography"); Gary Geating, Obscenity and Other
Unprotected Speech: Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 389, 403
(noting that "the identifiable minor... definition[] of child pornography only
prohibit[s] unprotected child pornography"). But see Lodato, supra note 70, at 133 1-
32 ("The courts have consistently explained that the government's only compelling
and permissible justification for prohibiting child pornography is to prevent the harms
associated with participating in the production of such material.").
293. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-57 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982)).
294. Id. at 758.
295. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990).
296. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (Supp. V 1999); see also supra note 129.
297. See S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 21 (1996) ("[The CPPAJ does not, and is not
intended to, apply to a depiction produced using adults engaging is [sic] sexually
explicit conduct, even where a depicted individual may appear to be a minor."). It is
likely that Congress added this defense to comply with the Supreme Court's
suggestion in Ferber that using youthful-looking adults would be a permissible way
around the statutory prohibitions in that case. See supra note 78. The point remains,
however, that to allow sexually explicit images of adults who look like children but
not computer-generated images that look like children is inconsistent-and
constitutionally suspect.
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never sexually molest an actual child and would choose pornography
which does not harm actual children if given the statutory choice. The
amendment proposed here allows such people their images, however
vulgar members of Congress, the Supreme Court, or society in general
may find them, provided they can show that no children were harmed
by the pornography.
This kind of affirmative defense could also actually lead to a
decrease in the number of children harmed by child pornography, a
result clearly within the Act's plainly legitimate sweep. The court in
United States v. Mento argued that a "safe harbor" for possessors of
child pornography which does not depict identifiable children "would
do nothing to prevent the sexual exploitation of... minors, and it
would permit the market for child pornography to thrive." ' This
Note respectfully disagrees. Knowing that virtual child pornography
is not illegal under the Act, child pornographers could shift their
business from abusing live children to generating virtual porn.'
Similarly, "a curious dabbler in pedophilia [would be] allowed to vent
his or her desire on a computer screen instead of ruining a child's life
for a sexual experience."''
This Note's proposed amendment also cures the Act's First
Amendment troubles.3"' This affirmative defense would keep the Act
from treading in constitutionally protected waters by assuring that
only child pornography that harmed actual children is proscribed.+
Without an actual event of abuse, be it physical or psychological
abuse, the possession or creation of virtual child pornography would
remain protected expression.- 3 This is in keeping with the Supreme
298. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 921 (4th Cir. 2000).
299. Friel, supra note 21, at 224-25.
300. 1d& at 225. The advent of virtual child pornography may also pose an
increased risk to children. Current technology allows pedophiles to alter innocent
photos of a child's friends or siblings to depict sexual conduct. Id. at 229. The child
then sees these familiar figures engaged in sexual conduct and is more readily
convinced such behavior is okay. Id. Consequently, a defendant invoking the
proposed affirmative defense must prove that no identifiable child is depicted in the
offending materials. See also supra text accompanying note 51 (discussing another
way in which virtual child pornography increases the risk to children).
301. See Burke, supra note 39, at 471 ("A reading of the statute that permits the
government to prosecute based only upon the strong appearance of a statutory
violation and then shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that the depiction is
neither real, nor advertised as being real, nor of an identifiable minor, should
withstand scrutiny.").
302. If the materials were deemed obscene under Miller, they could be freely
regulated without raising First Amendment concerns. See supra notes 68-70 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision in Miller and the
resulting definition of unprotected obscenity); Lodato, supra note 70, at 1343-44
("Obviously, if the material is obscene under the Miller standard, Congress may
prohibit its dissemination and receipt regardless of whether the material depicts
children.").
303. See Friel, supra note 21, at 248-49 (proposing an amendment that would not
criminalize possession of virtual child pornography, but would prosecute actual sexual
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Court's decisions in Ferber and Osborne, where the focus remained on
the harm inflicted on actual children.3 4
The terms of this proposed amendment ensure the appropriate
balance between the interests outlined in Osborne and those guarded
by the First Amendment.35 The CPPA as amended by this Note in no
way diminishes the government's ability to prevent the sexual
exploitation of children during the creation of child pornography, as
no children are sexually exploited to create virtual child pornography.
By requiring defendants to show that the materials in question do not
depict a recognizable child, the affirmative defense proposed here
assures that no child suffers the emotional trauma of knowing
pornographic images of her are circulating among pedophiles. This
Note's proposed amendment arguably discourages a market for
"traditional" child pornography which exploits actual children, by
allowing for an alternative method of creation.3 6
Under the CPPA as amended by this Note, virtual child
pornography can still be used by child abusers as a tool of seduction,
however. This is the only Osborne factor0 7 which remains in play
where virtual child pornography which does not depict an identifiable
minor is concerned. Accordingly, the balance shifts in favor of First
Amendment protection for such materials. This shift is especially
necessary where, as here, the remaining factor supporting an outright
ban on virtual child pornography is based on a presumption by the
legislature about what uses child pornography may be put to, rather
than an actual instance of abuse of a child.
The proposed amendment raises evidentiary concerns, however.
One of Congress' reasons for enacting the CPPA was to ensure that
defendants did not use improvements in technology as a "built-in
reasonable doubt argument in every child exploitation/pornography
prosecution."3°8  Congress feared that as technology advanced,
abuse or attempted sexual abuse of children); Burke, supra note 39, at 465 ("Among
free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and
punishment for violation of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech."
(quoting Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684,
689 (1959) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., &
Holmes, J., concurring))).
304. See supra notes 71-95 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court
decisions in Ferber and Osborne).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95, 250-60 (discussing the Osborne
factors and how they apply to virtual child pornography).
306. See supra text accompanying note 299.
307. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95 (discussing the four factors which led
the Osborne Court to uphold the constitutionality of a prohibition on the possession
of child pornography).
308. Hearing on S. 1237, supra note 30 (prepared testimony of Bruce A. Taylor,
President and Chief Counsel, Nat'l Law Ctr. for Children and Families); see also
supra notes 123-126 and accompanying text. This reasonable doubt defense was
attempted and either rejected or overcome in at least two cases, United States v.
Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723 (5th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Nolan, 818 F.2d 1015 (1st
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computer-generated images would become increasingly difficult to
distinguish from actual photographs or films.-" Shifting the burden to
defendants to prove that the materials in question were created using
a computer rather than a child removes this threat,31u but poses
evidentiary challenges for defendants. Proving that no actual child
was used in the production of a particular piece of child pornography
could be difficult, especially where the defendant downloaded the
images from the Internet. 31' These concerns do not rise to the level of
Due Process violations, however, as there are sufficient ways for
defendants to show the origin of the pornographic materials.1 2
For example, a defendant could demonstrate his or her skill in
manipulating computer-generated images, and an expert, appointed
by the defendant or the court, could analyze the defendant's
skill .... Or, the defendant could testify verbally as to how he or
she created the image, or watched it being created, and the fact-
finder could determine whether this testimony is credible.
313
Further, just as pornographic computer images are named to reflect
the ages of those depicted,3 4 so too could virtual child pornography
images be labeled to indicate that no children were used in their
production.3 15 The names of the files in question could be offered to
the jury as evidence that the defendant did not knowingly possess
pornographic images of actual children. 6 Similarly, Web sites
offering virtual child pornography could provide ample
documentation of the production process for the materials, to ensure
that defendants caught with such pornography could meet their
burden under this Note's affirmative defense. The fact that no
identifiable child is depicted in the images could be demonstrated
"either through factual evidence or through expert testimony... to
show that the depiction... is of an actual person and not different
Cir. 1987), though the appellate decisions in both left open the possibility of placing
the burden on CPPA defendants to prove that the materials in question were not
created using actual children. See Lodato, supra note 70, at 1354 (concluding that,
"[u]nder the reasoning in Nolan and Kinbrough... it is the defendant's burden to
prove that the child pornography was produced without using an actual child").
309. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 16 (1996).
310. See Lodato, supra note 70, at 1353 ("By placing the burden of proof upon the
defendant to prove that the child pornography in question was made without the use
of an actual child, one of Congress' reasons for prohibiting computer-generated child
pornography is rendered meaningless.").
311. Lee, supra note 37, at 678.
312. But see id. at 679 (finding that these evidentiary concerns -pose[] difficult
constitutional issues which may not withstand constitutional scrutiny").
313. Friel, supra note 21, at 259 n.348.
314. See supra note 213.
315. Some possible file names are "8goodasreal.jpg," "justlike9.jpg," and
"virtualkidz.gif."
316. While such evidence would not conclusively prove that the images in question
are not of actual children, it would serve as one element of a defense against a charge
of knowing possession of child pornography.
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features from different people[,] and to show that the bone structure
or other facial features are indeed of a minor. 3 17
Thus, the burden of showing that no actual children were used in
the production of the pornography in question, the pornography was
not marketed as portraying actual children, and no identifiable
children are depicted in the pornography is not undue. There are
adequate means for defendants to prove each element of the
affirmative defense proposed in this Note, and defendants wishing to
produce, collect, or distribute virtual child pornography will be sure to
use only those materials which a jury will find not to harm actual
children.
In sum, the amendment proposed in this Note provides a
constitutionally sound balance between the compelling state interest
in protecting actual children from harm, and the First Amendment
protection which necessarily extends to that speech we hate the
most.318 By focusing on injury to actual children, the CPPA as
amended by this Note prohibits only expression which harms, not
expression which merely offends. The First Amendment demands as
much, allowing legislatures to protect their citizens from actual injury,
while ensuring that disfavored ideas are not criminalized. 31 9
CONCLUSION
The First Amendment and the Supreme Court demand that child
pornography be regulated only where the well-being of children is at
stake. This mandate focuses attention not on the "secondary
effects" ' child pornography may have, but on the harms directly
associated with its production and existence. In Holder v. Free Speech
Coalition32 1 the Supreme Court will determine whether the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 strays from the limits imposed
by the Constitution and previous Court rulings. This Note urges the
Court to find that the Act as written is impermissible under the First
Amendment, and that the addition of an affirmative defense such as
the one proposed here would keep the Act within the boundaries of
the Constitution. Without such a defense, the Act sends government
down "the slippery slope"3"2 of regulating speech for the thoughts it
317. S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 31 (1996) (Additional Views of Senator Biden).
Senator Biden was explaining how the prosecution could meet its burden under a
separate section of the CPPA proposed by Biden to prohibit the use of identifiable
minors in sexually explicit depictions. See supra note 289.
318. See supra text accompanying note 241.
319. See supra Part III.A.1 (arguing that the CPPA as written impinges on First
Amendment freedoms by prohibiting more child pornography than that which poses a
direct harm to actual children).
320. Friel, supra note 21, at 246.
321. 121 S. Ct. 876 (2001).
322. Clay Calvert, The "Enticing Images" Doctrine: An Emerging Principle in First
Amendment Jurisprudence?, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 595, 607
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might put in people's heads, not solely the harm directly caused by its
expression.
(2000) ("If one class of speech can be said to somehow entice children into illegal
conduct, then surely Congress will continue to expand the definition of child
pornography, sweeping up and regulating more and more forms of previously
protected speech that allegedly influence children.").
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